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I. INTRODUCTION
For students in Detroit public schools, literacy is a luxury. 1
Students who attended the Plaintiffs’ schools in the 2020 Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals case Gary B. v. Whitmer exhibited
proficiency rates of “near zero in nearly all subject areas.” 2 Their
schools lacked resources and were routinely understaffed. 3 Even
worse, the Plaintiffs attended schools with decrepit conditions:
“[m]ice, cockroaches and other vermin” regularly infest the schools,
drinking water is unsafe, playground equipment routinely causes
injuries and schools lack regulation fire safety equipment.4 The
disparity in public school funding across Michigan and nationwide
only serves to disadvantage already subjugated groups. In Gary B.
v. Whitmer, students filed suit alleging that the State of Michigan’s
treatment of disadvantaged school districts like Detroit’s violated
their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.5
Education has not been explicitly recognized as a fundamental
right protected under the federal Constitution despite being
brought before the Court on numerous occasions.6 In Gary B., the
Sixth Circuit accepted the Plaintiffs’ argument that a basic
minimum access to education in the form of literacy was protected
as a fundamental right under the Constitution. 7 The Sixth Circuit
subsequently voted for rehearing en banc sua sponte.8 This decision
was followed by a settlement between the parties and a subsequent
dismissal by the Sixth Circuit on mootness grounds. 9 As a result of
the Gary B. litigation, the question of whether the Constitution
provides a basic minimum education still remains unanswered.10
1. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 620-21 (6th Cir. 2020).
2. Id. at 627 (emphasis omitted).
3. Id. at 624-27.
4. Id. at 626.
5. Id. at 621.
6. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding
“[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected”).
7. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 616.
8. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216, 1216 (6th Cir. 2020). Rehearing en
banc vacates the previous decision of the 6th Circuit’s three judge panel which
held that there was a basic minimum level of education (literacy) as a
fundamental right under the Constitution. Id.
9. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312.
10. Colter Paulson, Sixth Circuit Vacates Right-to-Literacy Ruling, NAT’L L.
REV. (June 11, 2020), www.natlawreview.com/article/sixth-circuit-vacates-right
-to-literacy-ruling [perma.cc/6FHN-EQHT].
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This case note will analyze the Sixth Circuit’s landmark ruling
in Gary B. v. Whitmer, which recognized that a basic minimum level
of education (literacy) was a fundamental right under the United
States Constitution. While no longer Sixth Circuit precedent,11 the
court laid out the requisite qualities for a case seeking to establish
education as a fundamental right. 12 Most notably, enshrinement
among the fundamental rights afforded to all Americans would
mean that in a deprivation of that right, the government must meet
strict scrutiny, the strictest standard imposed by the Court.
I will begin Part II by discussing the relevant Supreme Court
precedent leading up to the Gary B. litigation. Next, I will discuss
the factual background of the Gary B. case. In Part III, I will break
down the Sixth Circuit’s majority and dissenting opinions. Finally,
in Part IV, I will analyze the legacy of Gary B., including a
discussion on ways to establish fundamental rights, ultimately
proposing that future “education as a fundamental right” cases
consider the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

II. BACKGROUND
There are four major Supreme Court cases specifically
addressing the question of whether education is a fundamental
right under the United States Constitution. 13 I will begin by
discussing each in chronological order. Then, I will establish the
factual background for the Gary B. case. In the following Supreme
Court cases, the ways in which the plaintiffs characterize the
asserted fundamental right to education is in many ways
evolutionary to Gary B.’s ultimate characterization.14

11. See Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
12. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 616.
13. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982);
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); Kadrmas v. Dickinson, 487 U.S. 450
(1988); See also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (providing
important context to both the historical tradition of public education in America
as well as prevailing attitudes towards the importance of education in our
contemporary society, stating that “education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments” and “[i]t is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities”).
14. Compare Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (holding that “[e]ducation . . . is not
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected”), with Papasan,
478 U.S. at 284 (explaining that the Rodriguez “Court did not, however foreclose
the possibility ‘that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally
protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak
or the right to vote]’”) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36).
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A. Supreme Court Precedent
1. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which held that
there was no fundamental right to education—express nor
implied—under the Constitution.15 The Court categorized public
educational funding as socio-economic legislation which the State is
better suited to address.16 Additionally, by characterizing the
legislative action as socio-economic and not implicating a
fundamental right at stake, the Court effectively established that
fundamental right to education cases should be reviewed under the
most deferential standard of review for governmental action, the
rational basis standard.17
In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of
schoolchildren who were members of minority groups, resided in
lower income areas, or both.18 They alleged that the public school
finance system set up by the state of Texas—wherein the funding of
public schools was in large part determinative by a percentage of
property tax levied on the residents within the district—violated
the Equal Protection Clause.19 As a result of living in impoverished
areas, members of the class attended schools which received
significantly less state funding than wealthier districts in the
state.20 The plaintiffs alleged that they had a fundamental right to
education and that the funding system employed by the state of
Texas “operates to the disadvantage of [a] suspect class.” 21
The Court declined to recognize the plaintiffs as a suspect
group,22 reasoning that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
the financing system discriminated against an identifiable group of
people. In other words, wealth-based classifications were not
suspect.23 The discriminatory effects of the system were largely
inconsequential.24 Next, the Court determined that the importance
of public education was not a liberty interest and has no bearing on
its fundamentality for purposes of establishing an equal protection
15. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
16. Id. at 30.
17. Id. at 40.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 12-13. (noting the disparities between San Antonio’s most affluent
district and its least affluent district). As a result of racial demographics and
differing property values, the court noted that the least affluent district (where
the plaintiffs resided) spent about $356 per student on public education
compared with $594 per student in the most affluent district. Id.
21. Id. at 17.
22. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 61 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id.
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claim.25 Consequently, the Court reasoned that it was not the job of
the Court to create rights to guarantee equal protection under the
law.26 Rather, the Court’s duty was to determine whether the right
is deemed fundamental on the basis that it is guaranteed implicitly
or explicitly by the text of the Constitution.27 The Court determined
that there was no explicit protection of education within the
expressly enumerated rights in the Constitution and declined to
establish education as an implied fundamental right. 28 Since the
right was not fundamental, nor were the plaintiffs part of a discrete
class that the Court deemed suspect, the Court declined to apply
strict scrutiny, opting instead for the highly deferential rational
basis test.29 Under the rational basis test, the Court found a
compelling state interest in the employed public education funding
scheme.30 Finally, to satisfy the rational basis test, the Court
concluded that the compelling state interest in funding the State’s
public schools was rationally related to the state’s interest. 31
Ultimately, the Court deferred to the state legislatures finding
that this case presented issues of educational financing policy, an
“area in which [the Court lacking] specialized knowledge and
experience counsels against premature interference with the

25 Id. at 30. (stating that “the importance of a service performed by the State
does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes
of examination under the Equal Protection Clause”).
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
28. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
29. Id. at 40 (holding that “[a] century of Supreme Court adjudication under
the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the
traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State’s system be
shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes). Of note,
as the Court points out, the State of Texas conceded that its financing system
would be unable to withstand strict scrutiny had the Court found education to
be a fundamental right of the plaintiffs to be part of a suspect classification. Id.
at 16. Strict scrutiny requires that the government prove that there exists a
compelling governmental interest and that the regulation/governmental action
in question is the least restrictive means of achieving that governmental
interest. See id. at 16-17 (holding that “scrutiny means that the State's system
is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State rather than
the complainants must carry a ‘heavy burden of justification,’ that the State
must demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with
‘precision,’ and is ‘tailored’ narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it
has selected the ‘less drastic means’ for effectuating its objectives”);
Alternatively, the rational basis test merely ensures that the government has a
rational basis for implementing a statute or policy objective. See id. at 103-04
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 55 (finding that Texas’ plan is “rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product of responsible studies by
qualified people”).
31. Id. (“The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is
whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state
purpose or interest. We hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies that
standard” (citation omitted)).
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informed judgments made at the state and local levels.”32 As
previously mentioned, however, the Court specifically left open the
possibility that there existed some basic minimum level of
education guaranteed by the Constitution. 33
2. Plyler v. Doe
Following Rodriguez was another case from the State of Texas,
Plyler v. Doe, decided by the Supreme Court almost a decade later. 34
The relevant distinction in Plyler was that the State of Texas was
completely withholding free public education to undocumented
immigrant children.35 The Plyler decision reflected the Court’s
concern explained in Rodriguez: that complete deprivation of
education was unconstitutional and that there may be some basic
minimum level of education.36
The Plyler case addressed the question of whether a state may
deprive undocumented immigrant children of an education. 37 In
Plyler, the plaintiffs were challenging an amendment to Texas’
education laws which entirely withheld state educational funding
from undocumented immigrant children and allowed local school
districts to deny enrollment entirely to those undocumented
students.38 The plaintiffs advanced an equal protection claim
alleging that their exclusion from public schooling was in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 The
Court first ruled on the issue of whether undocumented immigrants
were even included in the class of people protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment—holding that they were.40
32 Id. at 42.
33. Id. at 36-37. (“Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum
of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful
exercise of either right [freedom of speech or the right to vote], we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide
an education that falls short.”).
34. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202.
35. Id. at 206.
36. Id. at 221-22 (stating that the “denial of education to some isolated group
of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause:
the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to
advancement on the basis of individual merit”). “Paradoxically, by depriving the
children of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by
which that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the
majority.” Id.
37. Id. at 205.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 205.
40. Id. at 210 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment provides “No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws”). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The State of Texas argued that foreign aliens
were not persons within their jurisdiction and thus the claim brought by the
plaintiffs was not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plyler, 547 U.S. at
210. The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the word “person” in the text
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Next, the Court turned to the applicable standard of review. 41
In reaffirming the Court’s holding from Rodriguez (that education
is not a right guaranteed under the Constitution) the Court
nevertheless asserted that “education has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society” and noted there are
“significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are
denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our
social order rest.”42 In noting its limitations upon establishing the
undocumented students as a suspect class, the Court vaguely
established the applicable standard of review as requiring the
furtherance of some “substantial goal of the state.” 43 In an
examination of whether there existed some “substantial goal of the
state” in the discrimination against undocumented children, the
Court denied the State’s arguments that the immigrant children
imposed a significant burden on State educational resources and
that the discrimination is in the State’s interest of “protect[ing]
itself from an influx of illegal immigrants.” 44 In sum, the Plyler
Court struck down the Texas legislation, but rejected the claim that
education was a fundamental right under the Constitution. 45
3. Papasan v. Allain
In the 1986 case Papsan v. Allain, the plaintiffs, a class of
school officials and schoolchildren from 23 counties in northern
Mississippi, alleged that a specific statute in Mississippi, which
provided for public school funding, unequally distributed funds
across the state and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. 46
of the amendment makes no allowance for the exceptions of undocumented
immigrants and that anyone who is subject to the laws of the state they are in
is afforded Fourteenth Amendment protections. Id. at 215.
41. Id. at 218.
42. Id. at 221 (The Court further elaborated on the idea of education as a so
called “great equalizer:” “denial of education to some isolated group of children
poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition
of governmental barriers based on individual merit”). Paradoxically, by
depriving children of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the
means by which that group may raise the level of esteem in which it is held by
the majority.” Id. at 222.
43. Id. at 224; See also Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459 (noting that the
circumstances in Plyler constitute “unique circumstances” for “a heightened
level of equal protection scrutiny”). In noting the undocumented students’
illegal presence in the country, the Court was unwilling to accept them as a
suspect class. Id. at 223. In spite of this, the Court was sympathetic to their own
agency in their undocumented circumstance: “Their ‘parents have the ability to
conform their conduct to societal norms,’ . . . but the children who are plaintiffs
in these cases ‘can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.’”
Id. at 220 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
44. Plyler, 547 U.S. at 228-29.
45. Id. at 230.
46. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 267, 273. The land was formerly held by the
Chicksaw Indian Nation had been ceded to the United States through the
Treaty of Pontitoc Creek in 1832. Id. at 271. Under state law, this land was held
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The plaintiffs in Papsan articulated many of the same claims that
the plaintiffs did in both Rodriguez and Plyler with one key
distinction—they alleged that “a minimally adequate education is a
fundamental right.”47 The Court ultimately deemed that the
plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts in their complaint, thereby
leaving the question unanswered.48 The case was dismissed in part
and remanded in part on the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim after
the Court deemed that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege
that they were deprived of “a minimally adequate education.” 49
4. Kadrmas v. Dickinson
The most recent case before the Supreme Court addressing the
issue of “a minimally adequate education” was brought in 1988.50 In
Kadrmas v. Dickinson, plaintiffs filed an equal protection claim
challenging a North Dakota statute which allowed local school
districts to charge a fee for bus transportation. 51 The plaintiffs in
Kadrmas
alleged
that
the
bus
transportation
fee
“unconstitutionally deprive[d] those who cannot afford to pay for it
of ‘minimum access to education.’”52 The Court noted that the fact
that the plaintiffs continued to attend school despite one of the
plaintiffs’ family’s inability to pay proved that there was no actual
deprivation.53 Rather, the transportation fee merely imposed “a
greater obstacle to education in the path of the poor than it does in
in trust for the benefit of the public and therefore the distribution of state funds
is implicated by different practice than the rest of the state. Id. at 273 (citing
MISS. CODE ANN. § 29-3-1(1)). The separate practice in school funding amounted
to the schools in the former Chicksaw land to receive state funding of $0.63 per
student compared to $75.34 for the rest of the state. Id. at 273.
47. Id. at 232.
48. Id. at 232. “Nor does this case require resolution of these issues [of
whether a “minimally adequate level of education is fundamental” Id. at 286.
The Papasan Court noted that the plaintiffs in that case failed to allege that
they “are not taught to read or write” or that they are deprived of “the
educational basics.” Id. See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 559 U.S. 662 (2009) (holding that the notice pleading
standard requires that the plaintiff allege sufficient facts to establish a claim
which is “plausible on its face”).
49. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286, 292. Plaintiffs likely needed to specifically
allege that the education provided by the state was of an insufficient level for
them to receive a “minimally adequate education.; merely alleging funding
disparities was determined to be insufficient by the Court. See id. at 288.
50. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 450.
51. Id. at 454; see also N.D. CENT CODE § 15-34.2-06.1 (1981 and Supp.
1987). The North Dakota statute set a limit on the fees to the estimated cost of
providing the service, however the Court reiterated the District Court’s finding
that the fee scheme of $97 per year for one child and $150 per year for two
children only “covered approximately 11% of the cost of providing the bus
service, and the remainder was provided from state and local tax revenues.”
Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 453-54.
52. Kadrmas 487 at 458.
53. Id.
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the path of wealthier families.”54 The Court therefore declined to
apply strict scrutiny on the basis that wealth is not a suspect
classification requiring heightened scrutiny.55 According to the
Court, the more appropriate standard of review was rational basis,
evidenced by its reluctance to “accept the proposition that education
is a ‘fundamental right.’”56
The Court was unwilling to accept the attenuated argument
that the plaintiffs’ refusal to pay a transportation fee had an impact
on the “perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates . . . adding to the
problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.”57 In
applying the rational basis test, the Court held that the
Constitution does not require a state to offer transportation to
school and, therefore, it certainly does not require a State to offer
such a service for free.58 Accordingly, the Court found that providing
school bus service was a legitimate state interest and that the
collection of a fee to subsidize the service is rational in relation to
that interest.59 While the Court upheld the North Dakota statute
and declined to apply a heightened level of scrutiny, it still never
answered the more generalized question of whether a minimally
adequate level of education is a fundamental right. 60

B. Gary B. v. Whitmer
1. Complaint
On September 13, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. 61 Plaintiffs
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 459 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230).
58. Id. at 462.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court merely recognizes that the relationship between the
asserted liberty interest in a minimally adequate education and the imposition
of a fee on school bus service is attenuated enough that it bears no rational
relationship between the deprivation of the asserted right. See generally id. at
458. There is no explicit denouncement that a minimally adequate education is
not a fundamental right under the constitution. Id.
61. Class Action Comp. at 1, Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852 (E.D.
Mich. 2018) (No. 16-CV-13292) [hereinafter “Plaintiffs’ Class Action
Complaint”]. Plaintiffs originally filed against then Governor Richard D. Snyder
among other state officials. Id. Snyder was the governor of Michigan from 20112019. Former Governors of Michigan, MICHIGAN.GOV, www.michigan.gov/
formergovernors/recent/snyder (last visited June 19, 2022) [perma.cc/CV7DUEZJ]. As Michigan’s state constitution caps gubernatorial term limits at two
four-year terms, Snyder was ineligible to seek reelection and was succeeded by
current governor Gretchen Whitmer. MICH. CONS. art. V, § 30. As a result, the
litigation changed case names to account for the change in office from Gary B.
v. Snyder to Gary B. v. Whitmer. See Governor Whitmer and Plaintiffs Announce
Settlement in Landmark Gary B. Literacy Case, MICHIGAN.GOV (May 14, 2020),
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alleged that the conditions in their schools deprived them of a basic
minimum level of education guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution; that the State of
Michigan violated the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment by
depriving the Plaintiffs of equivalent access to literacy as provided
in other public school districts in Michigan; that the State of
Michigan failed to protect the Plaintiffs from the dangerous
conditions in their schools; that the State impermissibly
discriminated or acted with deliberate indifference to the exclusion
of the class of student on the basis of race; and finally, that the State
maintained Plaintiffs’ schools in such a manner that violated Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 62 All claims
with the exception of the Title VI claim were filed under a violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.63
The Plaintiffs, students residing in Detroit, Michigan, alleged
that their public schools deprived them of their ability to access
literacy.64 According to the Plaintiffs’ complaint, the proficiency
rates in schools “hover near zero in nearly all subject areas.” 65 In
elementary schools, less than ten percent of third-grade students
“scored proficient or above on the State of Michigan’s 2015-16
English assessment test, compared with 46.0% of third-grade
students statewide.”66 The complaint alleged that this amounted to
a functional deprivation of access to literacy. 67
www.michigan.gov/whitmer/news/press-releases/2020/05/14/governorwhitmer-and-plaintiffs-announce-settlement-in-landmark-gary-b--literacycase [perma.cc/KV96-S6EG].
62. Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint, supra note 61 at 123-127.
63. Id. The Plaintiffs would later voluntarily dismiss their Title VI claim
and their claim that the State’s action or inaction failed to protect the plaintiffs
from the dangerous conditions in their schools. Gary B. v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp.
3d 852, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2018); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (stating “Every person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress []”). Section
1983 claims act as the vehicle through which citizens may bring suit to allege
that a state official’s acts are in violation of their Constitutional rights. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV (stating in pertinent part “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws”).
64. Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, at 17-20.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id. at 5. Complaint further notes that in the Plaintiffs’ high schools,
“12.5% of eleventh-graders scored proficient in English in 2014-15 compared
with 49.2% statewide.” Id. at 6.
67. See id. at 5. Complaint also notes that the only books in third-grade
classrooms were picture books, and some students cannot sound out letters. Id.
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Plaintiffs alleged a lack of resources in their classrooms, noting
that they further lacked appropriate textbooks for the grade level
and subject matter.68 When classrooms did have textbooks, the
textbooks were severely outdated and there were not enough
textbooks for the class size.69 Teachers expended “thousands of
dollars of their personal funds” to ensure their classrooms and
schools were stocked with basic necessities such as pens, pencils,
cleaning supplies and even toilet paper.70 Plaintiffs further alleged
that class sizes contained as many as fifty students at a time. 71
In addition to lack of resources, Plaintiffs alleged dangerous
conditions in their schools, such that they functionally deprived the
Plaintiffs of any meaningful way to achieve literacy.72 Classroom
temperatures often exceeded 90 degrees in the summer and in the
winter, were frequently cold enough that students and teachers had
to wear winter clothing indoors.73 The schools were so regularly
infested by “[m]ice, cockroaches and other vermin” that the
teachers’ daily morning tasks often included cleaning rodent feces
and dead bugs from the floors of their classrooms. 74 Schools often
had unsafe drinking water and unkempt bathrooms; “sinks d[id] not
work; toilet stalls lack[ed] doors and toilet paper;” and the roofs
would often leak.75 Playground equipment was unsafe and routinely
caused injuries, taboo items such as bullets, used condoms, and
even sex toys were often found on school grounds, and schools
lacked regulation fire safety equipment.76 Yet, school officials failed
to repair the decrepit conditions.77
In addition to the physical defects in the school property and
lack of materials, the schools were routinely understaffed.78 The
Plaintiffs’ schools often had a high staff turnover due to the
“appalling school conditions, insufficient materials, and
uncompetitive salaries.”79 As a result of the high turnover, classes
were often taught by unqualified paraprofessionals or in an extreme
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. “[Textbooks] are often long out of date, torn and beyond repair, or
marked up to be unreadable in places.” Id. “In multiple classes, students were
forced to share a single book in groups of four or more during class periods and
were not able to take books home.” Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 10; see also id. at 85-86 (Figure 13 depicts Cockroaches at one of
Plaintiffs’ schools).
75. Id.
76. Id. (describing the “taboo items” routinely found on school grounds near
the playground as alleged by Plaintiffs include: “bullets, used condoms, and sex
toys”).
77. Id. at 93-94; see also Figure 15, Plaintiffs’; Class Action Complaint, supra
note 61, at 94 (depicting buckets used in hallways to collect water leaking from
ceiling).
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id.
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case, older students.80
Plaintiffs alleged that literacy is a fundamental right. 81 In
support of their claim, they argued literacy was essential to success
later in life, and a deprivation of access to literacy degrades one’s
ability to participate in our democracy.82 Plaintiffs contended that
“[l]iteracy is a prerequisite to constitutionally protected
participation in the political process,” and that literacy was
necessary for participation in military service or to obtain
government entitlements.83 Finally, Plaintiffs posited that illiteracy
functionally precluded them from access to the judicial system and
that participation in our judicial system (such as serving as a juror)
would be precluded by the State’s failure to provide basic minimum
access to education in the form of literacy.84
Plaintiffs argued that the State’s “deliberate disinvestment
and indifference to the needs of Detroit school children” impeded
the Plaintiffs’ abilities to access literacy.85 The complaint noted that
students in Detroit Public Schools are predominantly low-income
students of color.86 As a result of the poor educational outcomes in
Plaintiffs’ schools, many students failed to matriculate to higher
education.87
In summation, Plaintiffs alleged that access to literacy was a
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.88 Plaintiffs also alleged that the lack of
materials, decrepit condition of their school facilities, and lack of
qualified teachers meaningfully deprived them of any reasonable
access to attain a basic minimum level of education.89
2. Procedural History
At the district court level, the “court found that the
Defendants were in fact the proper parties to sue” but dismissed the
80. Id. at 12-13. Complaint alleges that this issue was “further
exacerbated . . . by passing legislation permitting non-certified instructors to
teach in [Detroit Public] schools” which does not apply to other school districts.
Id. at 13. Plaintiffs allege that this legislation “singles out the children of
Detroit—the vast majority of whom are children of color—for separate and
inferior treatment.” Id.
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id. at 24, 30.
83. Id. at 31-32. Complaint further notes that illiterate persons cannot
“comply with mandatory government requirements such as filing tax forms or
selective service registration.” Id. at 32.
84. Id. at 33.
85. Id. at 59.
86. Id. at 59-60 (noting that of Plaintiffs’ schools, between 74.4% and 99.7%
of students were eligible for free or reduced lunch and more than 90% of
students were students of color).
87. Id. at 70-72.
88. Id. at 24.
89. Id. at 123-24.
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Plaintiffs’ complaint on the merits.90 The district court found that
the Plaintiffs had not “alleged a proper comparator for their equal
protection claim, nor had they highlighted any state policy or action
that was not supported by a rational basis.” 91 Further, the district
court reasoned that the Constitution did not affirmatively establish
that there was a right to a basic minimum education.92 Plaintiffs
and Defendants both appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.93

III. COURT’S ANALYSIS
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the Plaintiffs alleged that the
district court was incorrect in its determination that there was no
fundamental right to education in the form of literacy under the
Constitution.94 In support, Plaintiffs argued that state-provided
education is “deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition”
and that state-provided education is “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”95 Plaintiffs also argued that the Due Process
Clause bars compulsory attendance where children attend schools
which fail to provide access to literacy. 96 Plaintiffs alleged that by
state compulsion to attend schools which failed to provide access to
literacy, the state arbitrarily detained them without due process. 97
Finally, Plaintiffs asserted an equal protection claim, arguing that
the State’s denial of access to literacy in the Plaintiffs’ schools
denied them equal protection under the law as “they are
functionally excluded from the State system of education.” 98
Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were moot since they
90. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 621.
91. Id.
92. Gary B., 313 F. Supp. 3d at 875.
93. Gary B., 975 F.3d at 616.
94. Brief of Appellants at 35-37, Gary B., v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir.
2020) (No. 18-1855) [hereinafter “Brief for the Plaintiffs”] (arguing the district
court’s assertion that the “Supreme Court has unambiguously rejected the
claim that education is a fundamental right” was “incorrect” as the Court has
left open the question of “‘some identifiable quantum or education’ sufficient to
provide children with the ‘basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process’”) (quoting
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37).
95. Brief for the Plaintiffs at 37-42 (applying the Glucksberg test “the Due
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties, which
are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist
if they are sacrificed” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)).
96. Brief for the Plaintiffs at 47 (substantively, Plaintiffs argue that the
“confinement of students in buildings that are schools in name only, without
offering the concomitant benefit of access to literacy, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 54.
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were seeking retroactive relief which is barred under the Eleventh
Amendment.99 In support of their mootness argument, the
Defendants argued that they no longer had the control of Plaintiffs’
schools that they did at the commencement of litigation. 100
Defendants alleged that any remaining claims were barred by the
Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity protections. 101
Further, Defendants rebutted the Plaintiffs’ fundamental right
claim, Plaintiffs’ compulsory attendance claim, and finally,
Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.102

A. Majority Opinion
1. Standard of Review
The majority began by establishing the standard of review as
de novo.103 Since the district court granted the Defendants’ motion
to dismiss, the appellate court must “accept the factual allegations
in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.”104 The court emphasized that in
accordance with Twombly, “the plaintiff must allege facts that are
sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 105
99. Corrected Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 40, Gary B., v. Whitmer, 957
F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-1855) [hereinafter “Brief for the Defendants”];
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits citizens from suing a state as
a state, however a citizen may sue an officer of the state in their official
capacity); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (narrowing the Ex
Parte Young holding by only permitting suits against state officials where the
plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief or declaratory relief as opposed to
retroactive injunctive relief; the latter, the Court reasoned, would be effectively
an award of damages against the State as it would be paid out by the state
treasury and thus would effectively be a monetary judgment against the state).
100. Brief for the Defendants, at 41 [hereinafter “Brief for the Defendants.”]
(“As a legal matter, the locally elected DPSCD [Detroit Public Schools
Community District] Board of Education and its superintendent now have
direct control over the operation of the schools in the district”).
101. Id. at 45; see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits citizens from suing a state as a state, however
a citizen may sue an officer of the state in their official capacity); see also
Edelman, 415 U.S. 651 (narrowing the Ex Parte Young holding by only
permitting suits against state officials where the plaintiff seeks prospective
injunctive relief or declaratory relief as opposed to retroactive injunctive relief;
the latter, the Court reasoned, would be effectively an award of damages against
the State as it would be paid out by the state treasury and thus would effectively
be a monetary judgment against the state).
102. Brief for the Defendants at 50-85 (arguing against Plaintiffs’ assertions
and further arguing that the district court correctly applied rational basis
review and heightened scrutiny is improper).
103. Gary B. 957 F.3d at 630.
104. Id. (citation omitted).
105. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(holding that “[a] claim has factual plausibility if the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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2. Defendants’ Mootness and Sovereign Immunity Claims
As previously mentioned, Defendants argued that the
Plaintiffs’ claims were barred both on mootness and sovereign
immunity grounds.106 On their mootness claim, Defendants argued
that they have since relinquished control of the Plaintiffs’ schools to
local school boards.107 As a result of this transfer of administrative
authority, they alleged that this suit would amount to “retroactive
monetary relief,” thus “run[ning] afoul of the Eleventh
Amendment’s grant of sovereign immunity.”108 The majority
reasoned that the state officer’s supervisory authority still makes
them the proper party to sue.109 The court held that “Defendants
misconstrue Plaintiffs’ central claim in this case, which is that the
state—as the primary authority for public schools in Michigan—has
failed to provide them with a basic minimum education;” the
subsequent delegation of power back to local school boards does not
obviate the issue that the State itself is still the “primary authority”
for funding public schools within the state.110 Further, the court
clarified that “[a] defendant’s ‘voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice’ does not moot a case.”111
Turning to the Defendants’ sovereign immunity claim, the
court once again posited that Defendants’ arguments “misstated
both Plaintiffs’ requested remedy and the law.” 112 The court said
that the Plaintiffs’ request for “affirmative injunctive relief . . . ‘fits
squarely within the prospective-compliance exception to the
Eleventh Amendment.’”113 The majority concluded that the state
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).
106. Brief for Defendants at 40.
107. Id. at 41.
108. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 631 (relying in large part on Ex Parte Young’s
prohibition of lawsuits against states in federal court); see also Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123; Edelman, 415 U.S. 651.
109. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 631; see also Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784
F.3d 1037, 1048-49 (6th Cir. 2015); Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d 842, 848-49 (6th
Cir. 2018) (both cited by the court in support of its position).
110. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 631. (noting that under Michigan’s Constitution,
“the state board of education has ‘[l]eadership and general supervision over all
public education.’” Id. at 632 (citing MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 3)).
111. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 632. (relying on League of Women Voters v.
Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 473 (6th Cir. 2008)) (quoting Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351
F.3d 697, 704 (6th Cir. 2003)). The Court further notes an exception where
“subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Akers v. McGinnis, 352
F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir. 2003).
112. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 633.
113. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977); relying on
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 (holding “[i]f the prospective relief sought is
‘measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal
duty,’ it is the functional equivalent of money damages and Ex parte Young does
not apply”)).
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officers being sued here are “proper defendants . . . under Ex parte
Young, and the transfer of some control back to local officials does
not render th[e] lawsuit moot.”114
3. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim
The court first analyzed the Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim;
substantively, that “the Defendants discriminated against the
Plaintiffs by failing to provide the same access to literacy that they
give to other Michigan students.”115 The Plaintiffs argued that
under Plyler, they were afforded heightened scrutiny.116 In addition,
Plaintiffs further alleged that even if rational basis review were the
correct standard, the Defendants’ deprivation of access to literacy
cannot withstand this more deferential scrutiny. 117
The court began by explaining the significance of the Equal
Protection Clause.118 The majority reasoned that to adequately
allege an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must “make two
showings: first, that the defendants treated them differently from
other similarly situated persons, and second, that this difference in
treatment is not supported by a sufficiently strong governmental
interest.”119 Should a government policy discriminate on an
immutable characteristic such as race, strict scrutiny is the proper
standard of review.120 Conversely, if a regulation is social or
economic and does not “concern a protected class,” rational basis
review is proper.121 As the court noted, however, Plyler obfuscates
this analysis. Although it reasoned that wealth was not a suspect
class and education was not a fundamental right, the Plyler Court
seemingly applied a heightened form of scrutiny.122 As a result, the
majority gathered that Plyler’s holding indicated that “when a
discrete group of children is denied basic public education, such a
114. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 633.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see Brief for the Plaintiffs at 62; see Plyler, 457 U.S. 202, 230
(stating “[i]f the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free
publication that it offers to other children within its borders, that denial must
be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest”).
117. Brief for the Plaintiffs at 65.
118. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 634 (holding that “[w]hen a state distributes
benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject to scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “at its core, the
[Equal Protection] Clause says that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.” Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
119. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 634 (citations omitted).
120. Id. (Under strict scrutiny, policy or legislation will only be upheld if it
“furthers a ‘compelling state interest’ and is narrowly tailored in doing so.” Id.
(quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440)).
121. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 634 (relying on Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
122. Id. at 634-635; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24 (stating that “the
discrimination contained in [Texas’s policy] can hardly be considered rational
unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state.”) (emphasis added).
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policy can survive only if ‘it furthers some substantial state
interest.’”123
Applied to the facts of the Plaintiffs’ claims, the majority held
that the “Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to demonstrate disparate
treatment” between Plaintiffs’ schools and other schools that were
receiving access to literacy.124 The majority held that Plaintiffs’
allegations of disparate treatment were inadequate to support an
equal protection claim; the court held that “the Constitution cannot
guarantee educational outcomes.”125 Essentially, Plaintiffs did not
adequately allege any state policy or action for which the court could
assess the constitutionality of alleging solely disparities in
educational outcomes. While possibly insightful, it is not helpful in
the establishment of Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. 126 As a
result, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the equal
protection claim.127 The affirmation of the district court’s dismissal
of the equal protection claim, however, would not necessarily be
precluded from later amendment. The court noted that under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the district court may grant leave to amend
should “justice so require.”128
4. Plaintiffs’ Compulsory Attendance Claim
Plaintiffs’ alleged that by forcing their attendance at “schools
in name only,” the state arbitrarily detained them and violated their
substantive due process rights. 129 In support, Plaintiffs cited
Youngberg v. Romeo, a case where a man with severe intellectual
disabilities was injured and physically restrained while detained in
a state sponsored mental health facility. 130 The man brought suit
against the state under the Fourteenth Amendment alleging “that
the state failed to protect his liberty interests in ‘safety, freedom of

123. Id. at 635; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24 (holding that the
appropriate standard of review is a type of intermediate scrutiny). The rational
basis test burdens the plaintiff with proving that the governmental action is
both irrational and the governmental action is not rationally related to a
governmental interest. Id. Strict scrutiny places the burden of proof on the
government to establish that there is a compelling governmental interest and
that the governmental action is the least restrictive means in accomplishing
that governmental interest. Id. Here, a “substantial state interest” lies between
the extremes of standards of review Id.
124. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 635 (holding that Plaintiffs’ complaint “focuses on
school conditions and inadequately alleges state policies or actions that caused
those conditions within Plaintiffs’ schools and not in others”).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 635-37.
127. Id. at 637.
128. Id. at 638.
129. Id.; see id. at 640 (explaining: “forcing students to attend a ‘school’ in
which they are simply warehoused and provided no education at all would run
afoul of the Due Process Clause’s protections”).
130. Id.; see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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movement, and training within the institution.’” 131
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that compulsory attendance laws
were a sufficient restraint on Plaintiffs’ liberty interests to
implicate protections under the Due Process Clause. 132 Therefore,
the State’s interest in restraining that liberty interest must be
balanced such that “the relevant state interest [must] outweigh any
deprivation of liberty.”133 The State’s interest in educating its
citizens is widely recognized by the Supreme Court. 134 The Sixth
Circuit, however, noted that “forcing students to attend a ‘school’ in
which they are simply warehoused and provided no education at all
would run afoul of the Due Process Clause’s protections.” 135
As applied to the Plaintiffs’ claims, the Sixth Circuit reasoned
that while well rooted in the law and argued in their brief on appeal,
the compulsory attendance claim was not present in the Plaintiffs’
complaint.136 The court noted that the Plaintiffs’ briefly mentioned
compulsory attendance but did not assert that that claim was in any
way related to a deprivation of their constitutional rights. 137
Accordingly, the court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ compulsory
attendance claim on the grounds that the complaint was insufficient
to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” 138 To establish a compulsory
attendance claim, the Sixth Circuit held that (in addition to
sufficiently pleading the claim in the complaint pursuant to
Twombly and Iqbal) the “Plaintiffs would have to show that the
degree of restraint imposed on them cannot be justified by whatever
education, however negligible, they are receiving.”139 Similar to the
equal protection claim, the court explained that Plaintiffs on
remand could seek leave to amend to sufficiently plead their
compulsory attendance claim.140

131. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310-11, 314-15, 317, 320 (reasoning that right
to personal security is a “historic liberty interest” and is therefore protected by
the Due Process Clause). Accordingly, the Court held that there existed a
balancing test between an individual’s liberty interest and a State’s interest in
restraining the liberty of the individual. Id.
132. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 640.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 172 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 641.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 641-42 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) and
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
139. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 642.
140. Id.
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5. Fundamental Right to Basic Minimum Education
Finally, Plaintiffs in Gary B. attempted to characterize a
fundamental right to education in the form of access to literacy. 141
The Sixth Circuit began by analyzing the Due Process Clause’s
applicability to the establishment of fundamental rights.142 While
those rights explicitly recognized in the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights are “deemed to be ‘incorporated’ into the Due Process
Clause,” rights implicitly protected may also be deemed
“fundamental.”143
Washington v. Glucksberg set forth a two-pronged test to
determine whether an asserted liberty interest is fundamental
under the due process approach.144 The first prong seeks to
determine whether the asserted liberty interest is “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.” 145 The historical tradition
prong of the Glucksberg test has been applied both narrowly and
more broadly. Originalist Justices like Justice Antonin Scalia have
applied the test more narrowly when seeking to determine whether
the liberty interest was protected at the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.146 Alternatively, other Justices have been willing to
apply the historical test more holistically and consider evolutionary
factors.147 Recent Supreme Court decisions have lent more
deference towards broadly construing the historical tradition in an
attempt to achieve more equitable results rooted in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s underlying principles. 148 The second prong of the
141. Brief for the Plaintiffs at 26.
142. Gary B., 957 F.3d 642-43. (recognizing that “the Clause has [] been read
to recognize that certain interests are so substantial that no process is enough
to allow the government to restrict them, at least absent a compelling state
interest.” Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-21; Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Colling v. City of Harker Heights 503 U.S.
115, 125 (1992)).
143. Id. at 643 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 847, 849; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
144. Id. at 643.
145. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
146. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 715-16 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing “[w]hen it comes to determining the meaning of a vague
constitutional provision—such as “due process of law” or “equal protection of
the laws”—it is unquestionable that the People who ratified that provision did
not understand it to prohibit a practice that remained both universal and
uncontroversial in the years after ratification”).
147. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 671. (arguing “[i]f rights were defined by
who exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own
continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied).
This Court has rejected that approach, both with respect to the right to marry
and the rights of gays and lesbians.” (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 566-67 (2003)).
148. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (holding that such a narrow approach to
historical tradition is “inconsistent with our law.”); see also Obergefell, 576 U.S.
at 664 (holding that “[h]istory and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry
but do not set its outer boundaries. That method respects our history and learns
from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.” (citation omitted)).
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Glucksberg test determines whether the asserted liberty interest is
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”149
The Sixth Circuit looked towards the relevant Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the fundamental right to education. 150 In the
opinion, the court noted that Rodriguez made clear that there exists
“no broad, general right to education;” that the Supreme Court in
Papasan specifically left open the question of “whether a minimally
adequate education is a fundamental right;” that education is
important in the maintenance of “our basic institutions” and Plyler
established that its denial to a discrete group “must be justified by
showing that it furthers some substantial state interest;” and that
there is extensive history of a link between racial discrimination in
education in America.151
First, the court noted the relevant background that the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) provides in an implied fundamental rights analysis under
Glucksberg.152 The Warren Court in Brown stressed the importance
of education in American society:
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities. . . . It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
on all equal terms.153

Coupled with Supreme Court dicta from Brown and the more
explicit fundamental right to education cases, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that under a substantive due process analysis, there
existed an implied fundamental right to a basic minimum education
in the form of literacy.154 Ultimately, the relevant distinction
between a generalized fundamental right to education and
fundamental right to a basic minimum education in the form of
literacy lies in the penumbra of the Plyler decision.155 The
149. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. (internal quotation omitted).
150. Gary B., 957 F.3d 644; see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-39; Papasan, 478
U.S. at 285; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-24.
151. Id. at 644-45; see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-39; Papasan, 478 U.S. at
285; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-24.
152. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 645 (noting that although Brown was decided on
equal protection grounds rather than substantive due process grounds, it is still
instructive in the Glucksberg analysis).
153. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
154. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 648.
155. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37 (holding, [e]ven if it were conceded
that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right [freedom of speech or the
right to vote], we have no indication that the present levels of educational
expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short”); Plyler, 547 U.S.
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fundamental right to a basic minimum education seems to provide
a more quantifiable means by which to measure deprivation and
thus is a more attractive candidate for fundamentality than a
fundamental right to education more generally.
a. Historical tradition of public education in America
The Sixth Circuit started by acknowledging that America has
“a longstanding practice of free state-sponsored schools, which were
ubiquitous at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption.” 156
The majority reasoned that Americans “take [state sponsored
education] for granted” and have come to expect that it will be
provided as a right.157 Further, the majority acknowledged that
education, as a great equalizer in American society, could be used
as a tool to deprive African American students of a meaningful
education and subject them to greater discrimination. 158 In
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Supreme Court recognized Thomas
Jefferson’s explication of the essential nature education held in
American society.159 The Court asserted that even under an
originalist view, the historical tradition prong of the Glucksberg test
was met. In fact, at the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
thirty-six of thirty-seven states “imposed a duty in their [state]
constitutions . . . to provide a public school education.” 160 The
Supreme Court in Brown insisted, however, that “we cannot turn
the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was
adopted. . . .We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation.”161 Brown is further instructive because it provides context
to the ways that deprivation of education has been used as a tool to
suppress disfavored groups.162 Important historical context
recognizes that by “[w]ithholding [access to literacy], slaveholders
and segregationists used the deprivation of education as a weapon,
at 202 (holding that “denial of education to some isolated group of children poses
and affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on
the basis or individual merit). Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any
disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group
might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority.” Id.
156. Rodriguez 411 U.S. at 36-37
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (noting that
“[t]he American people have always regarded education and acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance”).
160. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What
Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV.
7, 108 (2008).
161. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
162. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 650.
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preventing African Americans from obtaining the political power
needed to achieve liberty and equality.” 163
The court gathered that such historical tradition “establishes
that education has held paramount importance in American history
and tradition, such that the denial of education has long been
viewed as a particularly serious injustice.” 164 In reaching this
conclusion, the court determined there was a longstanding history
to show that there is a cognizable connection between the
acquisition of education “as a prerequisite to the exercise of political
power.”165 Additionally, the majority reasoned there was an
extensive history to show that disfavored groups have had to turn
to the court to seek relief for denials of state sponsored public
education.166 Such reliance on the judiciary is in and of itself a
recognition that without literacy subjugated groups will have a
difficult time advocating for themselves in pursuit of establishing a
viable remedy to obtain literacy.167 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
held that the first element of the Glucksberg test (“that the right to
a basic minimum education—access to literacy—is so ‘deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition’”) was met. 168
b. Is a basic minimum education “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty?”169
In analyzing the second prong of the Glucksberg test, the court
163. Id. In support, the majority notes that teaching slaves to read was
previously a crime. Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 387-88 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 n.10 1966)). Further, the
historical tradition points towards targeted campaigns by segregationist groups
like the Ku Klux Klan: “Klansman targeted schoolteachers for violent
retribution and Black parents who sent their children to school frequently
‘received visits from white men eager to reinforce the nuances of the established
racial order.’” Id. at 651 (citing Amicus Br. of ACLU of Mich. At 19-22 (quoting
GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE
POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 97 (2007))). Further, Supreme Court precedent
like Plessy v. Ferguson, established the infamous “separate but equal” doctrine,
a doctrine upheld for 58 years until being overruled by Brown. See Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483. Even in
overturning Brown, states were resistant to desegregating their schools as the
Court’s instruction to desegregate “with all deliberate speed,” in Brown v. Bd.
Of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) was not specific enough that
desegregation cases continued to be brought before the court for some twenty
years later. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (coming before the
court from the State of Michigan where plaintiff brought suit against the
governor of Michigan (Bradley) alleging unconstitutional segregation in Detroit
public schools).
164. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 648.
165. Id. at 652.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).
169. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 721.
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had to “exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the
person so fundamental that the State must accord them its
respect.”170 In the court’s analysis of this element, the Sixth Circuit
majority looked again to Yoder, which established the Supreme
Court’s recognition of literacy as foundational to participation in our
political process and society.171 The Sixth Circuit distinguished the
liberty interest characterized in this case from previously rejected
liberty interests, such as in Rodriguez. “[T]he right asserted by
Plaintiffs in this case is more fundamental. The degree of education
they sought though this lawsuit—namely, access to basic literacy—
is necessary for any political participation.”172 The court determined
that “access to literacy ‘is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities.’”173 Invoking a penumbral approach to
implied fundamental rights analysis, the court noted that “[a]ccess
to literacy also ‘draws meaning from related rights,’ further
indicating that it must be protected.”174 Literacy is therefore
fundamental because in order to participate in other fundamental
rights, one must first have been provided access to literacy.175
The Defendants argued that access to literacy fails the second
prong of the Glucksberg test because “at the time of the adoption of
the U.S. Constitution, public education that went beyond
rudimentary local cooperation was nonexistent.” 176 The majority
was not persuaded by this argument because “the practices of the
1700s cannot be the benchmark for what a democratic society
requires.” Additionally, the majority cited Obergefell v. Hodges, in
which the Court recognized that “[t]he nature of injustice is that we
may not always see it in our own times.”177
170. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 652; Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 623-24.
171. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 652; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (noting that “some
degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence”).
172. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 652 (noting that “[e]ffectively every interaction
between a citizen and her government depends on literacy. Voting, taxes, the
legal system, jury duty—all of these are predicated on the ability to read and
comprehend written thoughts. Without literacy, how can someone understand
and complete a voter registration form? Comply with a summons sent to them
through the mail? Or afford a defendant due process when sitting as a juror in
his case, especially if documents are used as evidence against him?”).
173. Id. (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
174. Id. at 653 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 667); see also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that the First, Third, Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the constitution “have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” Essentially,
implied fundamental rights can be derived from the underlying principles of the
constitutional text that one could reasonably apply those principles to more
novel circumstances.)
175. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 653.
176. Id. (citing Brief for Defendants, supra note 100 at 51-52).
177. Id.; Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664 (continuing “The generations that wrote
and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume
to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to
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The Sixth Circuit majority also pointed out the existence of a
historical understanding of education as a “great equalizer” in
society.178 Plyler lends credence to this notion, explaining:
education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead
economically productive lives to the benefit of us all . . . denial of
education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one
of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of
governmental barriers present on the basis of individual merit.179

The Court takes a progressive view on correcting past
discrimination:
[t]he Supreme Court’s desegregation cases make it clear that stateprovided public education is important not just to provide a shot at
achievement in the face of inequalities of wealth and power, but
specifically as a means of addressing past racial discrimination that
restricted educational opportunities, and of course to maintain as
best we can whatever equal opportunity has already been achieved.180

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit found that the second prong of
the Glucksberg test was met; “[p]roviding a basic minimum
education is necessary to prevent such an arbitrary denial, and so
is essential to our concept of ordered liberty.” 181 As both prongs of
the Glucksberg test were met, the majority determined that access
to a basic minimum education—access to literacy—was a
fundamental right which is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. 182
c.

Contours to the fundamental right to a basic minimum
education under the majority’s holding

Part of the analysis under Glucksberg is that the Court must
present “a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.”183 Obergefell interpreted this language to “at least define
the extent of the right needed to resolve the matter at hand.”184 The
Sixth Circuit narrowly defined the fundamental right of access to
literacy here. The right does not guarantee the quality of education
the American public expects. 185 The holding merely guaranteed
future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty
as we learn its meaning). When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to
liberty must be addressed.” Id.
178. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 654 (discussing the “great equalizer concept” that
“regardless of the circumstances of a child’s birth, a minimum education
provides some chance of success according to that child’s innate abilities”).
179. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22.
180. Gary B., 957 F.3d 654.
181. Id. at 655.
182. Id.
183. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
184. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 659 (interpreting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 671).
185. Id.
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“access to skills that are essential for the basic exercise of other
fundamental rights and liberties, most importantly participation in
our political system.”186 When this case reached the Sixth Circuit at
the motion to dismiss stage, the court was not the proper fact finder
to determine with exact specificity what level must be required by
the State of Michigan, but it provided a contour for the district court
to consider on remand.187
The majority noted that specific educational outcomes cannot
be prescribed constitutionally.188 Rather, the holding of the court
mandated that the state provide “at least a rudimentary
educational infrastructure, such that it is plausible to attain
literacy within that system.”189 Three basic components are
involved in this determination according to the majority: facilities,
teaching, and educational materials.190 The quality provided by the
state in each of these categories must be reasonably sufficient that
students have a plausible chance of becoming literate.191
d. Do Plaintiffs plausibly allege that they were deprived of
such an education?
Finally, as a procedural manner, the court discussed whether,
under Iqbal, the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that they were deprived
of the education described above.192 The court reasoned that should
Plaintiffs’ allegations be factually confirmed, they “would
demonstrate that they have been deprived of an education
providing access to literacy.”193 As Defendants merely argued that
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 660.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 661; see also Iqbal, 556 US. At 678 (holding that “a claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged”).
193. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 661 (Plaintiffs adequately allege that they attend
schools which are “functionally incapable of delivering access to literacy”).
Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint, supra note 61 at 4, 19. The court determines
that in accordance with Iqbal and Twombly, plaintiffs’ allegations that their
schools have “significant teacher shortages;” “unqualified instructors;”
“dangerous and distracting conditions” (“including extreme temperatures,
overcrowding and lack of hygiene”); and “a dearth of textbooks and other school
supplies” reasonably leads to an inference that Plaintiffs’ schools cannot provide
an access to literacy. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 661; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 67778; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. Although outcomes are not constitutionally
guaranteed, statistical data cited by the Plaintiffs showing rates of proficiency
hovering around zero further support their claims. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 661. As
this case is on appeal at the motion to dismiss stage where the appellate court
must construe all the allegations by the plaintiff as true, the court reasons that
the Plaintiffs adequately allege that their schools deprive them of the
fundamental right to access literacy previously defined by the court. Id.
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there existed no fundamental right and the court has now found
otherwise, there was no reason to analyze whether the “deprivation
is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest” at this
stage of the litigation.194 As such, the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiffs’ fundamental rights claim was reversed and remanded,
meaning that the Sixth Circuit recognized a fundamental right to
literacy, thereby compelling the use of strict scrutiny for
deprivations of the newly-minted right.195

B. Dissent
In dissent, Justice Murphy of the Sixth Circuit mainly cited the
legislative branch as the proper decisionmaker for which to correct
this “socioeconomic ill.”196 The dissent preferred to apply Rodriguez,
which expressly states “education ‘is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution’” as compared to
Plyler.197
1.

Fundamental Right to a Basic Minimum Education

The dissent began by discussing the Plaintiffs’ claim that a
basic minimum education was an implied fundamental right under
the United States Constitution.198 It noted that cases like Rodriguez
signal the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to grant education as a
fundamental right.199 In refuting the Plaintiffs’ narrower claim that
some basic minimum level of education was fundamental, as
suggested in Papasan, the dissent argued that “[s]ubstantive due
process has never compelled states to provide their residents with
the funds they need to exercise fundamental rights.”200
First, the dissent argued that the majority’s holding is counter
to the prevailing line of Supreme Court precedent; cases like
Kadrmas, Papasan, Plyler, and Rodriguez all decline to recognize
194. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 661 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (additional
citation omitted)).
195. Id. at 662.
196. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 662 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
United States Constitution “does not give federal courts a roving power to
redress ‘every social and economic ill’” (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
74 (1972))).
197. Id. (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35).
198. Id. at 664.
199. Id.
200. Id. (Dissent argues that Plaintiffs’ insistence on state provided basic
minimum education to allow them to exercise other rights which are deemed
fundamental amounts to “an unprecedented subsidy for an unprecedented
right”). It is uncomfortable with the imposition of a new positive right which
effectively compels a state to provide governmental aid; such a holding conflicts
with caselaw both under the substantive due process context, but also more
generally in the cases before the court which previously addressed the question
of education as a fundamental right. Id.; see also Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285.
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education as a fundamental right.201 Further, the more tailored
argument presented by the Plaintiffs was not persuasive. 202
Regardless, the dissent argued that the Sixth Circuit need not even
address the question of whether a “minimally adequate” education
is fundamental, noting “[e]ven if the Constitution contains this
implied right, the plaintiffs’ substantive-due-process claim must fail
for a more rudimentary reason.”203
The dissent found a relevant distinction in negative rights
versus positive rights, which the majority glossed over.204 According
to the dissent, just because the Plaintiffs require literacy to
participate in the democratic process or in the exercise of other
fundamental rights, this does not compel the state to affirmatively
offer literacy to ensure their ability to participate in the exercise of
these rights.205
The dissent relied on the language of the Due Process
Clause.206 It concluded that the language of the Due Process Clause
is “phrased in the negative,” effectively prohibiting a state from
“depriving” individuals of “life, liberty, or property.” 207 Analysis of
the text’s meaning concludes that the clause acts “as a limit on the
state’s power to intrude on private rights” as opposed to being used
to “compel Congress to offer public services.” 208
After setting the stage for its due process analysis, the dissent
reasoned that the Plaintiffs never asserted the “State of Michigan
has ‘take[n] away’ their liberty to obtain a minimum education of
their choice.”209 Plaintiffs claimed “that the state has deprived them
of an education because the state has not provided them with an
education” does not pass due process muster. 210 Additionally, the
201. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 664 (Murphy, J. dissenting) (arguing that the
Circuit court is not in a position to rule against such definitive Supreme Court
precedent).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (arguing “[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized a ‘basic’
constitutional difference between a state’s use of its coercive power to regulate
its residents and the state’s refusal to sue its spending power to give them
things”). (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977). In support, the dissent
provides a free speech example: “[j]ust because the Free Speech Clause bars a
state from banning its citizens’ political speech, does not mean that the clause
requires the state to give them the funds they need to engage in that speech.”
Id. (citing Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 22223 (1989); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 364 (2009)).
205. Id.
206. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 665-66; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(stating in pertinent part “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”).
207. Id. at 666 (citing Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir.
1988)).
208. Id. (quoting David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 865-66 (1986)).
209. Id.
210. Id. (noting that “[o]nly in an area where ‘process’ equals ‘substance’
could ‘deprive’ equal ‘provide’”).
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dissent noted that at the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
was never read to affirmatively compel state-sponsored public
schooling.211
Next, the dissent turned to an analysis of the nature of the
Supreme Court’s substantive due process decisions, namely the
connection these cases have on state spending power. 212 Here, the
dissent argued the majority is effectively compelling state spending
through its decision: “[the Plaintiffs’ due process] claim must fail . . .
[because] [t]he Due Process Clause ‘confer[s] no affirmative right to
governmental aid.’”213
The dissent then turns to the implication of federalism in our
country. By recognizing a new fundamental right to a basic
minimum education, the majority “undercut[s] the people’s interest
in local decisionmaking [sic] whenever they nationalize new
extratextual rights.”214 As public education is traditionally reserved
to the states the majority intervened in an area best left to state
and local legislatures by providing a new nationalized extratextual
right.215 The dissent argued that each state is in a better position
than Congress or the federal judiciary to determine how best to
address “’intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems’ associated with this issue.” 216 Additionally, while no
positive right to education exists in the Constitution, the diseent
noted many states have created this positive right in their own state
constitutions.217 The majority’s holding therefore foreclosed on the
“political liberty” of the people of each state to determine the scope
211. Id. (noting that reading the Fourteenth Amendment in this way would
effectively “have meant that Congress had been violating the Fifth Amendment
for decades” as they had not established a national public school system”); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating in pertinent part “No person shall…be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .”). Essentially,
the dissent argues that as the Fourteenth Amendment in large part confers the
protections of the Fifth Amendment to further protect against state action, by
reading the Fourteenth Amendment to provide a positive right to public
education is incompatible without an understanding that the Fifth Amendment
imposes the same thing on the federal government. See Gary B., 957 F.3d at 666
(Murphy, J. dissenting).
212. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 667 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
213. Id. (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 486 U.S.
189, 196 (1989)) (holding that on substantive due process grounds, a state has
no affirmative duty to intervene in a deprivation of a person’s rights protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment where that deprivation is perpetrated by
private actors).
214. Id. at 668 (arguing that the nationwide expansion “place[s] the matter
outside the arena of public debate and legislative action’ within each state.” Id.
(quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720)).
215. Id. at 669.
216. Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42) (arguing that the states act as
“laboratories for experimentation” to determine how best to distribute state
funds to address educational funding issues).
217. Id. at 669-70 (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl,
Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 45054 & nn.97-126 (2015)).
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of educational rights provided by their own state constitutions. 218
Finally, under its due process analysis, the dissent looked to
the federal judiciary’s own place in making this type of
determination.219 According to the dissent, the federal judiciary has
“the authority to interpret the law; [but] . . . possess[es] neither the
expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments.” 220
Accordingly, the dissent reasoned that the court is to tread carefully
to avoid using the Due Process Clause to impose policy preferences
of the court.221 The dissent is concerned that the majority’s holding
would create an avalanche of cases before the courts about policy
controversies as related to a state’s failure in providing a basic
minimum education—the so-called “slippery slope.”222 The dissent
was deferential to state and local policy makers in this case.223
Finally, the dissent concluded that federal judicial power lacks the
expertise and knowledge to competently decide educational policies;
such policy judgments are therefore better left to the states. 224
2. The Majority’s Glucksberg Analysis Still Does Not Permit
an Imposition of a Positive Right to Education
Next, the dissent turned to analyzing the majority’s
Glucksberg analysis.225 It asserted that reliance on “analogies to
other allegedly ‘positive rights,’ . . . dicta in the Supreme Court’s
education decisions” and history of racial discrimination in
education is misplaced; it argued “[n]one of these points permits the
positive right to education that the majority finds in the Due
Process Clause.”226
First, the dissent argued that the Glucksberg test for finding
implied fundamental rights does not apply where it would compel a
state to provide government aid. 227 Because Glucksberg’s test was
formulated in the context of determining the constitutionality of
assisted suicide, it was not related to policy decisions compelling

218. Id. (citation omitted).
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538
(2012)).
221. Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 671 (reasoning that “[f]ederal courts are not equipped to
determine personnel policies or teacher-certification rules for the schools across
this country”).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. See also Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work:
The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73
ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2010) (explaining that positive rights are rights which
impose affirmative obligations on the government whereas negative rights
provide freedom to the people from governmental action).
227. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 671 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
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state spending.228 Explicitly, the dissent argued that the Glucksberg
test “should not even enter the field when a plaintiff challenges a
state’s alleged failure to provide a public service (as in this case), as
opposed to its deprivation of a liberty or property interest.” 229
Even if Glucksberg did apply, the dissent further found that
Plaintiffs’ due process claim would not satisfy the test. 230 Justice
Murphy was not persuaded that the Plaintiffs’ characterization of
their liberty interest in the more narrow sense (fundamental right
to a basic minimum education) was any different from that put forth
in other Supreme Court cases like Rodriguez.231 The distinction
between a “right to literacy” and a generalized right to education
complicates the historical tradition prong of the Glucksberg test.232
The support cited by the Plaintiffs to establish a historical tradition
is not narrowly tailored to a “right to literacy.”233 Further, the
Glucksberg court specifically cautioned that establishment of new
fundamental rights should be done carefully. 234 The dissent was
concerned that the Plaintiffs’ claim to a “right to literacy” was too
broad such that it “would mandate far more day-to-day federal
oversight of the states’ schools.”235 The dissent accused the
Plaintiffs of merely “relabeling” the liberty interest, which was
rejected by the Supreme Court’s previous education cases. 236
Next, the dissent addressed the Plaintiffs’ assertions accepted
by the majority that cases like Rodriguez and Papasan specifically
left open: the question of whether there existed some basic
minimum education.237 In refuting this question, the dissent noted
that these cases were decided in an equal protection context and did
not involve substantive due process.238 Instead, the dissent
228. Id.
229. Id. at 672 (noting the distinction between applications of the
Glucksberg test in cases like Glucksberg or Casey); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 702; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. The dissent analogizes the majority’s reliance on
“Glucksberg to find a right to a taxpayer-funded education is like relying on Roe
v. Wade to find a right to a taxpayer funded abortion.” Id.; see also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
230. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 672 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
231. Id.
232. Id.; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Gary B., 957 F.3d at 649-52
(Majority’s analysis of the historical tradition under Glucksberg).
233. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 672 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
234. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
235. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 673 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
236. Id.
237. Id.; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37 (stating “[e]ven if it were
conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally
protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide
an education that falls short”); see also Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285 (interpreting
the language of the previous sentence in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez to leave open the requisite question of “whether a minimally
adequate education is a fundamental right”).
238. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 675 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
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reconciled this case with DeShaney v. Winnebago County by arguing
that DeShaney’s default rule, which established that substantive
due process cannot compel state spending, applied in this
instance.239 The dissent noted that the Equal Protection Clause, in
some cases, can compel public spending to require a state to provide
resources equally.240 Alternatively, the dissent characterized
Papasan’s explicit question—read by the Plaintiffs and majority to
leave open the question of a basic minimum education—to instead
“reserve only ‘whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe
that [potential] right should be accorded heightened equal
protection review.’”241 In its analysis, the dissent did not foreclose
the possibility that the Plaintiffs could seek a remedy under equal
protection grounds, however, it, like the majority, felt that the
Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead a valid equal protection
claim.242 As the dissent thought the majority and Plaintiffs
impermissibly married Supreme Court education precedent under
the Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiffs’ claim should fail.243
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority that America’s
history of racial discrimination in education supports the
establishment of the right to literacy in this case.244 It argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a substantive right to a
minimum level of education, but instead created a right for equality
where the state chooses to provide for education.245 In discussing
Brown’s relevance in this case, the dissent seemingly argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment (as supported by Brown) merely
regulates that should the state provide for education, it must do so
equally.246 To the dissent, however, “equal” seems to mean that the
state cannot impermissibly discriminate on the basis of race;
“equal” does not in this case seem to apply for equal distribution of
resources as the Plaintiffs allege.247

239. Id.; see also DeShaney, 486 U.S. at 189 (1989) (holding that on
substantive due process grounds, a state has no affirmative duty to intervene
in a deprivation of a person’s rights protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment where that deprivation is perpetrated by private actors).
240. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 675 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
241. Id. (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285).
242. Id. at 676.
243. Id. (arguing that the Plaintiffs “seek something quite novel: heightened
scrutiny under substantive due process for Michigan’s failure to properly
subsidize their alleged fundamental right to a minimum education. The
Supreme Court’s equal-protection cases do not support that substantive-dueprocess request”). Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating in pertinent part “[n]o
State shall make or enforcce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
246. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 677-78 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
247. Id.
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3. Plaintiffs’ Compulsory Attendance Claim
Finally, the dissent concurred that the Plaintiffs’ failed to
adequately plead the compulsory attendance claim in their
complaint and thus have forfeited it on appeal. However, it
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that this claim has support
in the law, should they be able to seek leave to amend on remand.248
The dissent argued that the Youngberg exception relied on by the
Plaintiffs and majority, which provides that the state is under a
duty to provide public aid where an individual is under strict state
control, does not apply here.249 It argued that students are not
sufficiently constrained to “raise a school’s common law obligation
to the rank of a constitutional duty.”250 Accordingly, the dissent
found no support in Plaintiffs’ compulsory attendance claim, even if
it had been adequately plead.251 In sum, the dissent would have
affirmed the holdings of the district court. 252

IV. PERSONAL ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs in Gary B. presented a due process and equal
protection argument to attempt to establish a fundamental right to
education. In this section, I will analyze the methods by which
prospective plaintiffs may attempt to establish a fundamental right
to education. I will explore the deficiencies of the due process and
equal protection approach that has been unsuccessful before the
Supreme Court, and instead posit a new approach—through the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, I will briefly examine a more recent fundamental right to
education case on the federal docket and examine the possible
qualities which may more effectively establish a fundamental right
to education.
While the majority in Gary B. accepted a substantive due
process approach to establishing a fundamental right to education,
the fundamental right can be established many different ways. 253
Plaintiffs fail on a second route to establish literacy as a
fundamental right—under equal protection grounds—though the
court noted that on remand they may seek to amend their equal

248. Id. at 678.
249. Id. (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317).
250. Id. (quoting Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 510 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that although there exists a common law duty to provide a safe
environment, that duty is not a constitutional duty). The dissent further argues
that if a constitutional duty has been rejected in the context of a “safe” learning
environment, surely that decision would not be usurped by a claim seeking to
establish a constitutional duty in an “adequate” learning environment. Id.
251. Id. at 679.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 642.
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protection claim.254 Both of these routes, while effective, ignore the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Fourteenth
Amendment.255 While the majority discusses the historical tradition
as part of their substantive due process approach under the
Glucksberg test, it may be easier to establish a fundamental right
to literacy under the theoretical idea of the “lived constitution.” 256
The exclusion of the right among those explicitly enumerated is of
no consequence; the Ninth Amendment safeguards those implied
rights which the people deem necessary to protect. 257 In conjunction
with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment aids in
establishing rights which are so common in our society that they
should be, or contemporarily are believed to be protected by, our
federal constitution.258
The establishment of a right to education in all fifty states in
addition to the judicially recognized fundamental right to education
in some states signals a ratification by the people that state-funded
education is indeed fundamental to their own lives.259 As such, a
fundamental right to literacy may reasonably be derived from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the federal constitution is not meant to protect against every
“social and economic ill,” it should provide recourse where the
government effectively excludes a subjugated class from any
reasonable access to becoming literate.260
254. Id. at 637.
255. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating in pertinent part “[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis added)).
256. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 95 (2012)
(arguing that there exists an unwritten “lived constitution” which underlies and
supplements our written constitution). Applied here, Americans’ lived
experiences have come to expect government funded public schooling to the
extent that a functional deprivation of it runs afoul of both the state and federal
constitutions.
257. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (stating “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people”).
258. See, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
259. See Trish Brennan-Gac, Educational Rights in the States, ABA HUM.
RTS.
MAG.,
www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazinm_hom
e/2014_vol_40/vol_40_no_2_civil_rights/educational_rights_states/ (last visited
July 15, 2022) [www.perma.cc/6L3M-CZMR]
] (recognizing that as of 2014, twenty-two states (Wyoming, North Carolina,
Maryland, California, Connecticut, Washington, West Virginia, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Alabama, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Tennessee, North Dakota, Virginia, Arkansas, Montana, New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Vermont) recognize education as a fundamental right).
260. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 662 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
United States Constitution “does not give federal courts a roving power to
redress ‘every social and economic ill’” (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
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Finally, in settling this case, the Plaintiffs were unable to
answer the question of whether a fundamental right to literacy
exists under our federal Constitution. 261 As such, I look ahead to
current pending litigation to determine the plausibility that the
Supreme Court may soon consider the generalized question of
whether education is a fundamental right.

A. Establishing a Fundamental Right to Education
Through Traditional Due Process and Equal Protection
Analysis Can be an Arduous Process
The discourse between current Supreme Court jurisprudence
and the interplay between the majority and dissent in Gary B. show
that reasonable minds may disagree about the analysis of education
as a fundamental right both under due process and equal protection
analyses. Rodriguez, Plyler, Papasan and Kadrmas are instructive
on the difficulty of sustaining an equal protection claim. The only
case where Plaintiffs succeed is Plyler, and only where the state
blatantly deprives a discrete class of students from participating in
public education.262 Similarly, Plaintiffs in Gary B. fail to
adequately allege sufficient facts that they are treated any
differently than other schoolchildren in the state. 263 Separate and
apart from their inability to adequately allege disparate treatment,
a showing of discriminatory intent is often required to establish the
plaintiffs as a suspect classification, as equal protection is more
concerned with prohibiting discrimination by the government than
it is with safeguarding equal results. 264 While discriminatory
purpose may often exist, there are evidentiary problems in
specifically alleging discriminatory intent absent a congressional
record indicating discriminatory intent. 265 Where there exists a
history of purposeful racial discrimination (as is the case here with
America’s history of public school segregation), “unconscious
racism . . . underlies much of the racially disproportionate impact of
governmental policy.”266 Constitutional law scholar and University
74 (1972)).
261. Gary B. v. Whitmer, No. 18-1855, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312 (6th
Cir. June 10, 2020).
262. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202; Papasan, 478 U.S.
at 265; Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 450.
263. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 635 (holding that Plaintiffs’ complaint “focuses on
school conditions and inadequately alleges state policies or actions that caused
those conditions within Plaintiffs’ schools and not in others”).
264. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that “the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately
be traced back to a racially discriminatory purpose”).
265. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 1105 (1989).
266. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 (1987).
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of Chicago Law School Professor David Strauss argues that where
such history of racial discrimination exists, there is a reasonable
presumption that laws which have a discriminatory impact likely
stemmed from a discriminatory purpose.267 Thus, even if the
Plaintiffs in Gary B. were able to seek leave to amend and file a
factually sufficient equal protection claim, it would be unlikely that
they would be able to establish their class as suspect to receive
heightened scrutiny. An analysis under the rational basis test will
likely defeat the Plaintiffs’ case.
Establishing the fundamental right under due process
presents different challenges. Although the majority in Gary B.
provided a well-reasoned Glucksberg analysis and concluded that
education is a fundamental right, there may be an easier way. First,
the Due Process Clause by itself implies that no matter how
fundamental the right, there exists some level of process which
allows the government to infringe and possibly deprive one of that
right.268
Likewise, constitutional law scholar and Yale Law School
Professor Akhil Amar discusses Justice Harlan’s “substantive due
process” established in Griswold as oxymoronic.269 Amar opines
that the underlying concept of substantive due process evolved out
of many of the most repugnant Supreme Court decisions to date—
Dred Scott v. Sanford 270 and Lochner v. New York.271 Amar instead
suggests that in applying implied rights under the Constitution, the
267. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989). David A. Strauss is the Gerald Ratner
Distinguished Professor of Law at The University of Chicago Law School. David
A. Strauss, U. CHI. L. SCH., www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/strauss [perma.cc/
8FTZ-TA3Y] (last visited June 19, 2022).
268. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating in pertinent part “nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”
(emphasis added)); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(holding that strict scrutiny applied to governmental orders to relocate
Japanese Americans during World War II to internment camps, but that there
existed “a pressing public necessity” which made governmental action
constitutional) overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
269. Amar, supra note 256, at 119 (arguing that Justice Harlan’s
groundbreaking opinion in Griswold where he pens the phrase “substantive due
process” “borders on an oxymoron. Substance and process are typically
understood as opposites”). Akhil Reed Amar is Sterling Professor of Law and
Political Science at Yale College and Yale Law School. Akhil Reed Amar, YALE
L. SCH., www.law.yale.edu/akhil-reed-amar. [perma.cc/XJE5-D28P] (last
accessed June 19, 2022).
270. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, people of African descent brought to America
as slaves were not considered citizens of the United States and therefore were
not protected by the Constitution of the United States) (effectively overruled by
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV).
271. Amar, supra note 256, at 119; see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional state regulation of working hours mutually
agreed upon by employer and employee as a violation of freedom to contract
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).

838

UIC Law Review

[55:801

approach championed by Justice Harlan in Griswold would be
better established though “the overlooked privileges-or-immunities
clause” as opposed to “the overworked due-process clause.”272

B. The Right to Literacy is a Fundamental Right Under
America’s “Lived Constitution”
In America’s Unwritten Constitution, Amar dedicates an entire
chapter to a theory which he describes as “America’s Lived
Constitution.”273 For Amar, the idea is that implications of popular
sovereignty play into any extratextual interpretation of the
Constitution.274 Amar opines that “[t]he Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments . . . invite [us] to root [our] claim of right directly in
the principles of truth, justice, and the American way as understood
and practiced by the American people.”275 Such a reading of the
Constitution is still consistent with the text. For one, in the context
of a fundamental right to literacy, its establishment is wholly
compatible with the Preamble to our Constitution. 276 It is our lived
experience that for many people in America, the only way to
reasonably attain literacy is through government funded public
education. To deduce that the public schooling system does not
guarantee reasonable access to literacy is an affront to the values of
justice, welfare and liberty espoused in our Constitution.277
1. The Ninth Amendment’s Role in Establishing
Unenumerated Rights
The Ninth Amendment states in pertinent part: “The
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”278 In
“echoing the Preamble,” the Ninth Amendment invites the
interpreter to determine the role of popular sovereignty in their
272. Amar, supra note 256, at 121.
273. Id. at 95.
274. Id. at 103 (arguing “We must also consider lived rights. Simply put,
many of the Ninth Amendment rights of the people and the Fourteenth
Amendment privileges and immunities of citizens may be found in everyday
American life—in the practices of ordinary Americans as they go about their
affairs and in the patterns of laws and customs across the land). The rights of
the people include various rights that the people themselves live out; the
fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens encompass those things that
the citizens themselves treat as fundamental in their rhythms and routines”).
275. Id.
276. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. pmbl. (stating “We the People of the United
States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America).
277. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
278. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
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understanding of unenumerated rights. Only where the people
“have in some way or another endorsed, embraced, enacted or
embodied” the specific right should it be among those rights
retained through the Ninth Amendment.279
In Griswold, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, briefly
mentioned the Ninth Amendment in establishing a fundamental
right to privacy through his “penumbral approach.” 280 More
explicitly, in concurrence, Justice Goldberg wrote to “emphasize the
relevance of [the Ninth] Amendment to the Court’s holding. 281
While Justice Harlan advocated for the penumbral approach on its
own, Justice Goldberg advocated for the penumbral approach
espoused by the majority in conjunction with the Ninth
Amendment.282 Similarly, Amar advocates for the Ninth
Amendment in strengthening a Fourteenth Amendment claim of an
implied or unenumerated right under the lived constitution
theory.283 In his analysis, he considers two plausible methods of
interpreting the Ninth Amendment: to read the word “retained” to
suggest that the rights were held at the adoption of the Ninth
Amendment or to read “retained” to encompass natural rights—
those that existed prior to the institution of formalized
government.284 The latter reading, Amar reasons, allows the
Constitution to be more flexibly applied.285
2. Establishment of Fundamental Right to Literacy Under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
The Privileges and Immunities Clause, unlike the Due Process
Clause, is derived from the Constitution itself. 286 There is no
common law interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, whereas
due process jurisprudence has evolved to
encompass far more than just “process.” 287 In this respect,
establishing the right to literacy through the Privileges and
Immunities Clause finds legitimacy in the fact that the people
ratified the express language of the Constitution.288
279. Amar, supra note 256, at 103.
280. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (holding that a “zone[] of privacy” existed
among the penumbras of the Bill of Rights).
281. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring).
282. Id. at 493 (arguing “the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support
to the view that the ‘liberty’ protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
from infringement by the Federal Government or the States is not restricted to
rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments”).
283. Amar, supra note 256, at 103.
284. Id. at 108-09.
285. Id.
286. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.
287. See Amar, supra note 256.
288. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause states in pertinent part: “[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States.”289 “The clause naturally directs interpreters
to muse upon the wisdom of ordinary citizens rather than the case
law of judges. Many of the privileges and immunities of citizens may
be found by paying heed to citizens—what they do, what they say,
what they believe.”290 Justice Harlan took a similar approach in
Griswold, reasoning that citizens had almost universally come to
expect that they had the privilege of marital privacy and access to
contraceptives.291 In the context of establishing an implied
fundamental right to education, Americans have come to expect
public education to be provided by the states. As previously noted,
at the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, thirty-six of thirtyseven states had express provisions within their state constitutions
providing for public education.292 By 1960, Wyoming, Maryland and
North Carolina had established education as a fundamental right
under state law.293 As of 2014, twenty-two states had established
education as a fundamental right. 294 The trend of all fifty states
providing public education and the growing trend of states
establishing education as a fundamental right which may not be
infringed upon shows that the democratic process indicates that
Americans favor education as a right. This growing recognition of a
fundamental right to education is therefore precisely the type of
right which may be established under the combination of the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Deprivation of this right across different states serves to be a
violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. As noted in
Corfield v. Coryell, this clause protects
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming
free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles
are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general
heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
290. Amar, supra note 256, at 119-20.
291. Id. at 120.
292. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 160, at 108.
293. Brennan-Gac, supra note 259.
294. Id.; see also Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977); Abbott v. Burke,
575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851
S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); McDuffy v. Secretary of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516
(Mass. 1993); Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);
Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (all
establishing a fundamental right to education under their own state
constitutions).
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kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole.295

A basic minimum education is a fundamental right which
implicates the Gary B. Plaintiffs’ “enjoyment of life and liberty” and
their ability “to pursue and obtain happiness” and avoid undue
restraint on the part of the government.296 For a right as integral to
success in our society as education, inequity is only exacerbated
where some states provide for it as a fundamental right and others
do not. Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the right to
education is one which federal recourse should be available for those
who are unjustly deprived of a reasonable opportunity to be
educated.
Critics posit that establishment of a fundamental right to
literacy or more generally, education, is better left to the legislative
branches and the states.297 Where the legislative branch does not
undertake the responsibility to ensure its constituents rights are
adequately protected, judicial review exists as a mechanism for
redress.298 As Americans, we have come to expect state-provided
public education, such that a deprivation in quality to a discrete
group of inner-city school children is an affront to the values
espoused by our federal Constitution. The importance of literacy in
today’s society effectively compels states to provide literacy to
schoolchildren whom they have undertaken a duty to teach.
Literacy is, therefore, part of our “lived constitution.” 299 As literacy
reasonably facilitates public participation in the political process
and enables an individual to be a productive member of our society,
it equally meshes with the public policy values enshrined in our
Preamble,300 but has also become a privilege under the Fourteenth
Amendment such that it should not be subject to arbitrary
governmental deprivation. As the majority in Gary B. notes, “it is
unsurprising that our political process, one in which participation
is effectively predicated on literacy, would fail to address a lack of
access to education that is endemic to a discrete population.” 301 “The
295. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (1823).
296. Id.
297. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 662 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
298. See generally Amar, supra note 256, at 136 (arguing that “[s]ince the
Fourteenth Amendment also envisioned judicial recognition of new rights to
supplement Congress whenever Congress was asleep at the switch,
overwhelmed with other business, or controlled by critics of Reconstruction,
section 5 provides a better benchmark for judicial rights-finding than does
Article V. Thus, judges should look for the same broad national support for a
new right that would warrant a properly functioning Congress to recognize the
right under its own authority.”); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 5 (stating
“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article”).
299. Amar supra note 256, at 95.
300. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
301. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 655.
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lack of literacy of which [Plaintiffs] complain is exactly what
prevents them from obtaining a basic minimal education through
the normal political process.”302
Critics (including the dissent in Gary B.) further argue that
Plaintiffs merely relabel the characterized liberty interest from a
more generalized right to education to a more specific right to a
basic minimum level of education. 303 What the dissent seemed to
ignore, however, is that a basic minimum education is the bare
minimum. As states and the federal judiciary have refused to
provide a legal remedy for students like those in Gary B., plaintiffs
must resort to diluted liberty interests to better appeal to the
leanings of the court. Such dilution only serves to hurt the country.

C. Looking Forward: A.C. v. Raimondo
Given that Plaintiffs in Gary B. subsequently settled with the
State of Michigan following the Sixth Circuit’s sua sponte decision
to review its own decision en banc, the decision was vacated and no
longer has any precedential value in the Sixth Circuit, nor will it
ever reach the Supreme Court.304 Shortly after Gary B., a new case
arguing for a fundamental right to a basic minimum education was
filed in Rhode Island.305
In A.C. v. Raimondo, a class of students filed suit against the
state of Rhode Island alleging that the state did not provide them
with “an adequate civics education.”306 Similar to the Gary B.
litigation, the Rhode Island class’ claims are predicated on the
deprivation of reasonable ability to participate in civic activities
brought on by the deprivation of a minimum level of education. 307
Where Plaintiffs in Gary B. filed suit under due process and equal
protection, plaintiffs in A.C. include a violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment among their
claims.308 Plaintiffs in A.C. sought declaratory and injunctive
relief—asking the Court to declare access to meaningful education
a fundamental right and to prevent the state from enacting laws
which interfere with access to receiving a meaningful education. 309
302. Id. at 655-56.
303. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 673 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
304. Gary B., No. 18-1855, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312 (6th Cir. June 10,
2020).
305. A.C. v. Raimondo, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188769, at *3 (D.R.I. October
13, 2020.
306. Id. (stating that, “students allege that various public officials have
failed to provide them and other similarly situated students with ‘an education
that is adequate to prepare them to function productively as civic participants
capable of voting, serving on a jury, understanding economic, social, and
political systems sufficiently to make informed choices, and to participate
effectively in civic activities’”).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 4 (providing “the students ask this Court to ‘[d]eclar[e] that all
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While recognizing the Gary B. holding and pointing out the
importance of civic education in the tumultuous political times we
currently inhabit, the District Court was unwilling to “deliver or
dictate the solution.”310
The District Court of Rhode Island applauded the Gary B.
court’s efforts in establishing a fundamental right to literacy by
“[standing] on the broad shoulders of Justice Marshall[’s]” dissent
in Rodriguez.311 The court implied that its denial of a remedy in A.C.
is not because it disagreed with the Gary B. court, but rather,
because a right to literacy and a right to a civics education are
distinguishable; the court notes that being literate is much more
rudimentary to one’s ability to participate in civic duties than a civic
education would be.312 The court in A.C. concluded the holding of
the Sixth Circuit in Gary B., even assuming it still held precedential
value in the Sixth Circuit did not extend a basic minimum education
to the context of a civics education. 313
On plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the District Court
reasoned that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to establish
that they were part of some suspect class which would trigger
heightened scrutiny.314 Accordingly, the governmental actions were
easily sustained under the rational basis test. 315
While recognizing plaintiffs’ privileges and immunities claim,
the court does not analyze it in detail. 316 Because the court
distinguishes Gary B., it is likely that it would deem a right to a
civics education to not be among those expected by the American
public such that it effectively becomes a part of our “lived
students in the United States have a right under the [Constitution] . . . to a
meaningful educational opportunity’ that will adequately prepare them to be
‘capable’ voters and jurors, as well as to exercise all of their constitutional rights
and function as ‘civic participants in a democratic society[.]’ Plaintiffs also ask
this Court to ‘[e]njoin[] the defendants . . . from failing to adopt such laws,
regulations[,] policies and practices as are necessary to ensure’ that those
educational opportunities are provided”). (internal citations omitted).
310. Id. at 21-22 (holding that “[u]nfortunately, this Court cannot, for the
reasons explained below, deliver or dictate the solution — but, in denying that
relief, I hope I can at least call out the need for it”).
311. Id. at 50; see also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
312. A.C. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188769, at *51 (holding “[b]ut there is a
difference. The examples cited by the court in Gary B. to illustrate why literacy
is imperative for citizen participation in a functioning democracy — voting,
taxes, jury duty, even reading road signs — are all indeed ‘inaccessible without
a basic level of literacy’ — but they are not wholly inaccessible without civics
education. So, while it is clearly desirable — and even essential, as I argue in
the Introduction — for citizens to have a deeper grasp of our civic
responsibilities and governing mechanisms and American history, this is not
something the U.S. Constitution contemplates or mandates.”). (internal
citations omitted).
313. Id. at 52-53.
314. Id. at 57-58.
315. Id. at 58.
316. See id. at 3.
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constitution.”317 Plaintiffs in A.C. therefore fell victim to many of
the other fundamental right to education cases filed in federal court
and their case was dismissed.318
In its public advocacy for a fundamental right to a basic
minimum education, plaintiffs in A.C. established a website
updating their litigation efforts.319 On their website, attorneys for
plaintiffs indicate their intent to appeal to the First Circuit Court
of Appeals.320 Whatever the fate of A.C. on appeal, students across
the United States continue to voice concerns for the issues of equity
in our public school systems. Even if the courts are unwilling to
redress these concerns, the national spotlight on these issues can
only serve to shed light where there is darkness.

V. CONCLUSION
While the Sixth Circuit briefly established a fundamental right
to a basic minimum education in the form of literacy, its subsequent
history demoted its precedential value to be merely persuasive. As
opined by the District Court of Rhode Island in A.C., “[the Gary B.
opinion] makes a compelling argument grounded in history,
precedent, constitutional interpretation, and public policy. It has
the spirit of Justice Marshall's Rodriguez dissent in its sail . . . it
stands as a significant articulation of the importance of education
to our democracy.”321
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs and the majority in Gary B., the
fight is not over. Disparities still exist in public education, placing
some students in a better position to succeed than others. While
unsuccessful, cases like Gary B. and A.C. provide important
discourse on racial, social, and economic disparities in America
today.322 Establishment of a fundamental right to literacy is one
small step on the journey towards establishing education as a
fundamental right more generally. As eloquently explained by the
District Court in A.C.:
This case does not represent a wild-eyed effort to expand the reach of
317. See id. at 51 (holding “while it is clearly desirable — and even essential,
as I argue in the Introduction — for citizens to have a deeper grasp of our civic
responsibilities and governing mechanisms and American history, this is not
something the U.S. Constitution contemplates or mandates”).
318. Id. at 61.
319. See Cook (A.C.) v. McKee: The Case to Establish a Right to Education
Under the U.S. Constitution, CTR. EDUC. EQUITY, www.cookvraimondo.info/
[perma.cc/5VPB-R9BH] (last visited June 19, 2022).
320. Id. (stating “Plaintiffs will appeal the case to the First Circuit. Judge
Smith’s decision has given them a road map for convincing the appeals court
that judicial intervention is necessary to remedy the ‘deep flaw’ in our nation’s
education enterprise and remedy the educational adequacy and equity issues
the case raises”).
321. A.C., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188769, at *52.
322. See id.; Gary B, 957 F.3d at 616.

2022]

Education as a Fundamental Right

845

substantive due process, but rather a cry for help from a generation
of young people who are destined to inherit a country which we — the
generation currently in charge — are not stewarding well. What these
young people seem to recognize is that American democracy is in
peril. Its survival, and their ability to reap the benefit of living in a
country with robust freedoms and rights, a strong economy, and a
moral center protected by the rule of law is something that citizens
must cherish, protect, and constantly work for. We would do well to
pay attention to their plea.323

Whatever the solution to America’s educational equity
problems, Gary B. and A.C. point the spotlight on issues of national
importance. We would all benefit by taking a closer look.

323. A.C., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188769, at *7.
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